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Abstract  
In recent years there has been a dramatic growth in the field of youth civic engagement, though little 
of this work has been conducted in fragile democracies contending with legacies of war and 
authoritarianism. This study explores how Guatemalan postwar generation youth develop as civic 
actors under extreme conditions of violence, social and political distrust, and a dwindling space for 
public expression. Drawing from ethnographic research conducted in rural and urban Guatemala, 
this study demonstrates how young people’s sense of civic efficacy interacts with their 
interpretations of historical injustice and the civic messages mediated by teachers, families, peers, 
and communities. Young people struggle to define and enact appropriate civic action, at times 
working outside unjust systems as a means of fostering change. 
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Introduction 
During my first month in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala I was troubled by the graffiti on a 
cement wall that declared, “human rights are dead.” The letters were cleanly stamped with a stencil 
in black and red ink. One evening while walking home I noticed a group of young people in knit ski 
masks, hovering under a streetlight. They chatted casually, some twirling baseball bats, others 
gripping scrap metal. Convinced I had sighted my first gang, I clung to the side of the house and ran 
to the back door. Soon I came to know this group as one of the self-claimed “neighborhood watch” 
vigilantes. Local youths took turns monitoring the streets at night, while community members 
brought them refreshments as thanks for keeping the streets safe. My middle-aged neighbor assured 
me, “They are not delinquents. They are the good ones.” When I asked a young person about the 
“death” of human rights, he affirmed that, “rights in Guatemala do not exist. That is why we have 
the group.”  
This instance brings to the surface several of the central paradoxes regarding youth attitudes 
toward civic participation in Guatemala today, notably the way outlooks turn on questions of 
violence, human security, and the right to justice in the face of impunity. It also demonstrates the 
restructuring of roles that civil society actors take on when they perceive that the human rights and 
civil contracts do not exist, as well as how these roles are interpreted from within a society whose 
experience with violence appears to be ongoing. Are these actors practicing civic engagement 
through decisive, albeit drastic, action—or are they delinquents using extrajudicial violence as a 
threat to control the community? Does this group demonstrate how youth have inadvertently 
embraced a culture of violence as a consequence of Guatemala’s history of protracted violence—or 
does it reveal the way citizens intervene when their government is too weak to protect them? 
States undergoing democratic transition have increasingly invested in civic education 
projects, often linking democratic civic participation to peacebuilding goals (Bellino, 2014; Oglesby, 
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2007). But despite the Ministry of Education’s civic education reforms in the years following the 
civil war, Guatemala’s postwar generation remains wary of democracy (Schultz et al., 2011; Cruz, 
2011). Just twenty years ago in Guatemala, to critique the state was tantamount to a death sentence 
(CEH, 1999). Young people today may be born into families who have lost members to state 
repression, witnessed or experienced brutal violence, or suffer from psychosocial trauma related to 
the war. Understandably, many of the adults in these young people’s lives are fearful of civic 
participation, distrusting the state and fellow citizens. Moreover, young people’s daily experiences 
reflect a society where deep disparities persist between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. 
Guatemala is no longer an authoritarian regime, but it is not yet the multicultural democracy its 
postwar transition has promised. 
This paper aims to contribute to the theorizing of youth civic development by depicting a 
complex portrait of civic culture in a fragile postwar democracy. I begin by examining the linkages 
between historical injustice, legacies of authoritarianism, and the re-criminalization of social 
movements in Guatemala’s “postwar” era. Drawing from ethnographic data gathered in formal and 
informal educational spaces, I then explore how young people struggle to define and enact 
appropriate civic action—at times, stretching the bounds of what has traditionally been envisioned 
as participation for the common good. I close with a discussion of the implications for formal civic 
education in societies where young people develop as civic actors in extremis.  
Youth civic development, fragility, and the legacies of war 
 In recent years, there has been a dramatic growth in the field of civic education, youth civic 
engagement, and an effort to define the contours of “new civics,” (Flanagan and Levine, 2010; 
Levine and Soltan, 2014; Levinson, 2012; Sherrod et al., 2010). Research has demonstrated that 
young people shape their understanding of the social contract, fairness and justice, and a sense of 
social belonging, through their daily experiences with civic agents and institutions (Flanagan et al., 
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2010; Abu El-Haj, 2007). Accordingly, schools, families, and communities play important mediating 
roles in youth civic development, through formal and informal educational exchanges. 
 However, much of the existing work on youth citizenship has taken place in stable societies, 
despite distinct needs of new and struggling democracies, as well as calls for increased international 
research (Sherrod et al., 2010). (Some exceptions include Dyrness, 2012; Levinson, 2007; Reimers 
and Cardenas, 2010) Findings from a variety of educational interventions in post-conflict contexts 
suggest that fostering civic agency among young people is essential to instilling democratic principles 
and practices in the aftermath of violence. Authors conceptualize youth civic agency in various ways, 
e.g., civic culture (Davies, 2004) civic values (Johnson and Johnson, 2005), “enabling ethos” 
(Paulson, 2008), empowerment (Schwartz, 2010), and “upstanding” (Murphy and Gallagher, 2009). 
Across these constructs, there is consensus that “post” generations in general, and young people in 
particular, need to (re)gain a sense of control over their own lives, while viewing themselves as 
important and efficacious members of society. However, growing evidence suggests that legacies of 
war and authoritarianism inform young people’s conceptions of civic agency and efficacy in complex 
ways (Cesarini and Hite, 2004; McCully, 2012; Quaynor, 2012) 
 Further complicating the legacies of violence and division that young people inherit, 
“postwar” Guatemala ranks as one of the most violent countries in the world. States emerging from 
mass violence are often considered “fragile,” an increasingly contested, catchall term denoting a 
state’s inability or unwillingness to provide citizens with basic services (OECD, 2007). In states 
unable to allocate sufficient resources to citizens, communities have demonstrated extraordinary 
creativity and resilience in caring for one another, constructing opportunities for education, 
healthcare, and local governance. Researchers of youth citizenship have been particularly interested 
in the role of civil society “filling the gap” left by weak and fragile states (e.g., Kassimir & Flanagan, 
2010). On one hand, these instances conjure an impression of a robust civil society eagerly 
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embracing the potential for community organizing in a struggling state. But filling the gap may 
emerge from deep and longstanding frustration at the state’s incapacity to fulfill its basic duties, or 
deliberate, historical exclusion toward particular populations. In this way, fragility can undermine the 
relationship between citizens and the state, even inverting the civil contract. When the state does not 
ensure basic rights such as safety and justice, citizens search for ways to establish their own safety, as 
well as their own systems of justice (Davis and Warner, 2007; Snodgrass Godoy, 2002).  
Not surprisingly, the Guatemalan population questions the validity of constructs such as 
human rights and democracy (Bellino, In press). The most recent iteration of the International Civic 
and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) reveals that Guatemalan youth reported significantly lower 
trust in their national government, political parties, courts of justice, police, and “people in general,” 
than their peers in Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Paraguay (Schultz et al., 
2011: :42-43). On measures of democratic attitudes, a large majority of Guatemalan adolescents 
revealed support for dictatorships and authoritarian governments when they stood to bring about 
“order and safety” and “economic benefits.” Moreover, Guatemalan students expressed significant 
skepticism that peace could be achieved through dialogue and negotiation, supporting 
appropriations of justice “if the authorities fail to act” (Schultz et al., 2011: : 65-66). Other studies 
have established similarly high levels of distrust between citizens and state institutions, as well as 
weakened connections between citizens (Cruz, 2011). Conditions of what Adams (2011) calls 
“chronic violence” have yielded widespread vigilance among citizens, shattered social networks, and 
narrowed safe spaces to the most trusted circles. Communities like those in Quetzaltenango both 
work together to protect the streets, while scrutinizing the actions of fellow community members. 
How do young people develop a sense of their civic efficacy under these extreme conditions? 
Violence and the criminalization of civic action 
	   6 
 From 1960-1996, Guatemala was entrenched in a thirty-six year civil war known as the 
Conflicto Armado, the “armed conflict,” which included ethnic genocide of indigenous Mayan 
populations. Among other factors, the conflict was set off by the state’s increasingly repressive 
response to land and labor activists demanding redistribution of resources and the assurance of basic 
rights in a profoundly unequal society. Though the conflict was between the guerrilla rebel movement 
and the state military, paramilitary, and police forces, most of the 200,000 casualties were innocent 
civilians, a majority of whom were indigenous men, women, and children living in rural areas (CEH, 
1999). The truth commission that investigated this period of violence established that state actors 
were responsible for the vast majority of human rights violations during the conflict, including acts 
of ethnic genocide, although very few of these actors have been brought to justice. The “official” 
story, as narrated in national curricular resources, details a Communist rebel army that threatened 
national security, defeated by the protection of a strong government and state military (Bellino, 
2014).  
 Although it is arguable whether the guerrilla insurgency, who took up arms and committed 
some hideous acts of violence in the context of the conflict, could be construed as a rights-based 
movement, their stance toward social and political reform established certain enduring notions of 
social justice and collective action. Citizens who are “active” or “involved” are presumably radical, 
left wing, and socialist in their ideology. One need not organize a resistance movement to be cast as 
a radical political actor; claiming basic rights and even participating in community service can be 
perceived as meddling and intrusive, outside the scope of one’s “civic” duty. Civic action has been 
so politicized through the experience of authoritarianism that participation in public spaces is 
regarded as fundamentally dangerous, disruptive, and violence-provoking. Though these tropes stem 
from the past, they take on new resonance in the “postwar” landscape.  
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 Nearly twenty years after the Peace Accords that formally ended the conflict, Guatemala 
exhibits one of the world’s highest rates of violent crime and a 97-98% rate of impunity (UNDP, 
2012). The main scapegoat is youth delinquency, encompassing gang activity and petty crime, 
leading to rampant criminalization of youth (Levenson, 2013). Amidst widespread violence, some 
individuals demand, and some officials have been implicated in, carrying out campaigns of social 
cleansing targeting alleged delinquents, prostitutes, and gang members (Sanford, 2003; Sanford, 
2008). In some cases, social cleansing is regarded as a preemptive deterrent of street crime, while in 
other cases it is a volatile response. Like many violent acts, social cleansing blurs the lines between 
delinquency and vigilantism, while rationalizing the use of violence as a mechanism of crime 
prevention. Vigilante justice movements have increasingly taken hold across the country (Snodgrass 
Godoy, 2002), communicating that “people’s justice” is the only effective mechanism for justice in 
Guatemala. These acts convey justice as a “common good” rather than within the domain of a weak 
and dysfunctional state.  
 Meanwhile, political violence directly and tangentially related to the past continues. Those 
who seek legal justice for past and present crimes endure daily death threats, violent attacks, and 
attempts to delegitimize and incriminate the individuals seeking change. Indigenous cultural groups, 
community leaders, and peaceful protesters of resource extraction projects have all been targets of 
political repression (Isaacs, 2010a; Sas, 2007). During the Conflicto Armado, the repressive state 
targeted both political and civic action, and thus all “involvement” in the public sphere could be 
construed as political, even if its intentions were framed around locally bounded outcomes. 
Throughout Guatemala’s history, community movements have been construed as a threat to state 
legitimacy (CEH, 1999). 
 Under these extreme conditions, one might expect social justice advocates and community 
leaders to be revered by civil society for their courage to question norms and demand rights and 
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protections. But activism and social movements have been criminalized, both in terms of the 
physical threats they endure and the way popular discourse portrays social justice advocacy as 
meddling. Actors participating in collective movements are frequently regarded as social menaces, 
violence provokers, subversive delinquents, and even terrorists (Isaacs, 2010b; Isaacs, 2010a). The 
act of civic organizing as a valid approach to questioning the existing power structure has become 
discredited, through discourses of power and in everyday conversations among families and within 
schools (Bellino, 2013). In this high-risk setting, authoritarian legacies come into focus, 
demonstrating how the realm of the civic has been politicized in profound and enduring ways. 
Methodology  
This paper draws from fourteen months of ethnographic research in Guatemala, spanning 
2010-2012. I designed the study as a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1999), situated in four 
communities in Guatemala, two in the urban capital city and two in rural, indigenous pueblos located 
in the province of Izabal. In each setting, I spent 6-12 weeks as a participant observer, living with 
families, attending 11th and 12th grade classes at local schools, and participating in community events. 
Additionally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with young people (ages 16-24) in each 
community context, some with students transitioning from secondary to university education. Our 
conversations centered on young people’s interpretation of Guatemala’s history of authoritarianism, 
the peace process and democratic transition, and their sense of identity and efficacy as civic actors in 
today’s “postwar” era.  
In this paper, I draw from data collected in one urban working class school community of 
Guatemala City, where all student participants self-identify as mestizo (“mixed” race), and a rural, 
Q’eqchi’ Maya community called Río Verde, where all student participants self-identify as indigenous 
Maya. Though the two groups of young people do not physically interact, the issues they embrace 
intersect in notable ways, demonstrating the way social movements and their discourses are 
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mobilized, appropriated, and critiqued across a divided state. Comparative ethnographic cases 
illustrate the way that civic identity and strategies for public engagement are locally informed, though 
not bounded by place and space.  
The history of citizenship in each of these communities is distinct, as are the contemporary 
civic issues facing rural indigenous and urban working class populations. In drawing together these 
data, I do not intend to make claims about how or why particular groups of young people are 
collectively socialized or predisposed to approach civic action in particular ways. Rather, my aim is 
to explore how young people make meaning of the spaces available to them for civic expression, 
how they interpret existing social movements in their current society, and how they develop 
conceptions of good citizenship, often in ways that suggest working outside of unjust systems as a 
means of fostering change. In this sense, I am actively exploring the interaction between formal and 
informal educational spaces.  
The medium and the message 
Political graffiti is not uncommon in Guatemala City. It is one of the few spaces where 
citizens can voice deep frustration and distrust toward state institutions without fear of 
repercussions. In a state known for its silence (Bellino, 2014; CEH 1999; Oglesby 2007), scathing 
messages materialize overnight, often pointing fingers at state actors and institutions for past and 
present crimes. Cement walls across the city transform the landscape so that people are physically 
surrounded by the markers of social and political movements, along with the litany of infractions 
committed by the state. Public declarations such as the death of human rights simultaneously draw 
attention to these movements, while normalizing the use of forbidden and marginalized spaces to 
voice dissent. Though these acts blur the lines between civic action and vandalism, for many young 
people, voicing critical messages requires a turn to illegal media.  
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Valeria (20, university student in Guatemala City) describes an anti-mining protest 
movement she co-coordinated at her university. She was comfortable parking a borrowed school 
bus across the highway to block traffic, despite that many of her classmates viewed this as crossing 
the line between legal and illegal forms of protest. For Valeria, the roadblock tactic was more 
powerful than gathering along the side of the roads or organizing a protest march. She explains that 
the success of a struggle depends on its ability to draw attention and interrupt normal routines, even 
if the attention comes from going outside the law.  
They [my classmates] say that there are other forms of participation. They only 
wanted to bring signs and stand on the side of the road… They wanted a more 
peaceful form, but they never initiated anything, so we decided to block the roads. 
This is the only way to get attention. We don’t want to be violent, but this is how 
you win a struggle, this is how your struggle will appear on TV and people will hear 
about it. You need to do something that has an effect.  
When I ask whether the roadblock feels like a “middle ground,” bending but not breaking 
the law, she disagrees. “For many people, blocking the highway is serious. It is like vandalism… 
They get very angry.” Her involvement in the protest lost her seat in student politics, because her 
classmates viewed her actions as too radical.  
Although this distortion between civic and criminal action carries serious consequences, it is 
a worthy transgression for many young people. It might even be their only space for civic 
expression. Valeria’s classmate explains:  
  In Guatemala, no one listens... No one will listen if we don’t go into the streets.  
  This is the only way. Yes we break the law, but we have to break the law to show  
  the people that the law is unjust. 
At times, the legality of extreme action is seemingly not in question. Alejandro’s father, an active 
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member of the urban student movement during the civil war, explains to his son (17, Guatemala 
City) that political graffiti is not illegal when it is in the interest of upholding human rights. Together, 
they decide where “painting” about indigenous rights issues will carry the most weight in the capital. 
This father-son lesson demonstrates the way working outside the law is often a calculated 
measurement of the value of the message, weighed against the cost of the medium of expression.  
In some cases, the medium of graffiti or traffic obstruction risks devaluing the message itself. 
When Ricardo, a 19-year old Q’eqchi’ Maya who lives in his home village, sees urban protests on 
television, he explains, “These protests are illegal acts… They are a negative example.” He reasons 
that breaking the law adds credence to the argument that activists are criminal, thereby weakening 
“all popular movements across the country.”  
Members of youth activist group HIJOS, Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice 
Against Forgetting and Silence, are concerned that social movements are routinely criminalized. This 
condition requires that their mission extend beyond educating the public about the civil war and its 
enduring effects; like many activists, they now have the added burden to educate the public about 
the legitimacy of collective organizing. Despite that their central mode of communication with the 
public is through “guerrilla art,” they critique the media for representing them as delinquents. After 
an annual protest in the capital on “Army Day,” HIJOS members complain, “Did you see how the 
media is representing us? Like we are the bad guys…” Forced into marginal spaces, they worry 
about the tensions they navigate and generate, often further agitated through media depictions that 
portray their actions as delinquent. According to these young people, the majority of their 
interactions with the state are peaceful, but the media only reports on moments of tension. In turn, 
these representations allow the public to dismiss collective organizers as agitators.  
HIJOS members similarly share a code of ethics about what messages merit the medium of 
graffiti. In order to be painted, the message has to carry sufficient value to the social or political 
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movements that their group supports. When one boy painted the name of his favorite soccer team, 
two members chastised him, arguing that the extra time it took to write that message put them in 
danger for an issue unworthy of the risk it entailed. The conversation centered around whether it 
was a selfish or collective message, but also with awareness that the risks they take on to convey 
their message through an illegal medium requires that the message be worth disseminating.  
The significance of political graffiti is further complicated by the prominence of gang graffiti, 
so that messages are often undercut by the medium and dismissed outright as vandalism, a 
conflation that is not lost on young people. Young people like Ricardo see graffiti as the defacement 
of public property, not as a marginalized civic expression. Yet students at an urban high school 
whose cement walls are lined with political graffiti readily differentiate between political and 
delinquent messages. They proudly display their “political wall” with messages that dare to implicate 
their current President in genocide. Meanwhile, they volunteer at a nearby park to clean gang graffiti, 
concerned that these messages devalue their school neighborhood.  
 The history of collective organizing is relevant in each of these discussions, both 
transgenerational conversations among young people and intergenerational conversations between 
youth and their parents or teachers, whose experience during the conflict plays a significant role in 
their willingness to embrace civic action. Alejandro’s father who encourages his son to paint and 
embrace “the struggle” was a student leader and remains active in social justice issues. Alejandro 
embraces the idea that the popular struggle did not fail, but is ongoing in that the same root 
inequality and injustice continues to divide the people and deny particular groups their basic rights. 
He is less concerned with breaking the law than “breaking the silence.”   
 Graffiti could work well. It could teach the people about [justice] struggles   
 happening in the country that they don’t know about… But I think the biggest   
 problem in Guatemala is apathy. First, people do not know—this is a    
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 problem, and breaking the silence is important. But then when they do know, they  
 do not care. This is another issue. 
On the other hand, parents’ commitment to the resistance movement during the war does 
not unequivocally lead to a transmission of their struggle to the next generation. Ricardo’s mother 
and father were members of the guerrilla, and today they adamantly forbid their son’s involvement in 
transgressive political acts. Ricardo carefully aligns his beliefs with theirs. 
It is like my father says. The [protestors] are breaking the law. This is not the goal  
 of the struggle. My parents struggled during the Armed Conflict so that we could   
 have the right for peaceful dialogue. They should be having a dialogue, not a   
 protest… they should stand on the side of the road and hold signs, not interrupt   
 traffic… They  should respect the law.  
Meanwhile, Valeria views her mother as her “partner” in the struggle. Though she is 
cognizant of breaking laws to be heard, she explains that these transgressions are not essentially 
violent. It is the response of the state that turns peaceful protests into violent conflicts, and this is 
how the myth of political “involvement” continues to scare people into silence and inaction.  
It is exactly like during the Armed Conflict. The students are being aggressive,   
 maybe, because they are blocking the roads. But are not being violent. The   
 response of the state, the police, bringing soldiers to scare the students—this is   
 what is causing more conflict. 
 By design, activism is meant to be public and collective, but a cluster of adolescents in 
Guatemala is routinely perceived as a gang. Performative displays further complicate this public 
perception, as the visual and discursive nature of activist performance is intentionally disruptive. The 
need to be provocative in order to generate a reaction, coupled with the lack of public space to 
safely dissent, has forced many young people into unofficial spaces of protest where they can be 
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vocal while remaining anonymous.  
Re- making justice 
In urban areas, neoliberal reforms have shifted everyday security from the realm of the state 
to the market. In many rural areas, these market-driven security mechanisms do not exist. Instead, 
rural citizens have identified strategies for working together in order to “fill the gap” left by a weak 
state, giving rise to illicit expressions of civic engagement and community organizing. Rather than 
report criminals to a corrupt police force and funnel them into a dysfunctional justice system, 
citizens make their “own justice” (Snodgrass Godoy, 2002; Burrell, 2013).  
 Oscar (18, Guatemala City) and I drive along the curving, unpaved street to San Juan 
Sacatapequez, where handmade signs nailed to trees start small: white squares of poster board with 
thick block lettering that says, “We are organized.” Further in, the signs become larger and more 
precise, “We are organized for a San Juan without delinquency” and the explicit warning, “No 
delinquency. We are organized.” One of the signs says, “SWAT,” referencing the US acronym for 
“Special Weapons and Tactics,” and displays a local phone number. Signs are posted at each curve 
of the road, nearly every twenty meters. Closer to the town entrance, there is a billboard-size display, 
“We are safe because we are organized here.” Painted images surround the letters, flaunting faces 
hidden behind black ski masks. These signs are meant to deter criminal and petty violence from 
entering the village borders, but they also serve as a proud display of peoples’ ability to come 
together as a community in the face of a shared threat. Further, it signifies the autonomy of the 
pueblo in a state that has historically marginalized and excluded indigenous peoples and cultures. 
Oscar says with a note of envy, “The people here are organized… they don’t need the police.” Like 
Quetzaltenango, this community does not trust that state police have the skill or the will to maintain 
order and justice.  
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 Accordingly, villagers have found ways to pick up the slack and rely on one another, rather 
than the state. Oscar explains, echoing the logic of the young boy in Quetzaltenango, “Communities 
make their own justice… They would not organize if it weren’t necessary. If the state was… just, 
then the group would not have a purpose.” These statements reason that in the absence of state 
security and the guarantee of basic rights, citizens are forced to take care of themselves, even if it 
requires going outside the law. The range of law breaking within the category of popular justice is 
great, from “benevolent” neighborhood watch groups to public lynching, but the moral logic of 
these extreme actions is shared by youth across the country, even when they do not condone the 
acts themselves. The reason that popular justice exists is because there is no justice at the state level. 
The police are immoral, prisons are havens of corruption, and criminals can buy their freedom. 
Even wealthy elites agree that in Guatemala, “They sell justice.” Accordingly, justicia propia, “one’s 
own justice,” is regarded as the only recourse and in many cases a duty to the community in a weak 
state.  
 In Río Verde, students in a twelfth grade social studies class explain that justicia propia is a 
form of resistance against state laws, and the racial exclusion, corruption, and impunity that hollow 
these promises. Álvaro (18) reasons that every pueblo has “its own form of fighting back. This pueblo 
burns.” Though extreme, these expressions of extrajudicial justice mediate the people’s anger at 
being gravely neglected on a national level (Snodgrass Godoy, 2002). Yolanda (17) explains, 
If the people don’t respond, who will punish the criminals? …Here, someone can kill 
a child, or ten children, and never get caught or go to jail. He can keep killing. This is 
why people respond in this form… We have the right to safety, but the state does 
not give us this right. This is why people must respond. 
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State police collect bodies and bribes but do not initiate investigations, less so in rural areas where 
there are few accountability mechanisms. Yolanda and Álvaro’s classmates agree, “Maybe it is not 
right, but it is how we keep our streets safe.” Others add, “The law does not work here.” 
 Acts of justicia propia do not always conform to this model of collective action. At times they 
have led to violent public murders and the physical destruction of state property and symbols of 
state authority. The echoes of the war are striking: the state’s anti-insurgency campaign included 
both public displays of punishment for subversion and the desecration of Mayan cultural and 
spiritual symbols (CEH, 1999). Yet justicia propia is not a mere reversal of wartime power structures 
and learned expressions of violence; nor are they straightforward articulations of “Maya justice” 
(Burrell, 2013; Levenson, 2013). These instances of punitive “justice,” implemented in the absence 
of state authority, transgress categories of civic and criminal action. They obscure and complicate 
motives, resistance, and historical injustice and its legacies, creating a “grey zone” (Levi, 1989; 
Sanford, 2003) in the civic space between enacting justice and perpetrating injustice. 
 Their teacher, César, holds up a newspaper and says he can hardly bring himself to read 
about Guatemala anymore, things have gotten so bad. Students embrace this rare opening for 
dialogue in what is traditionally an authoritarian classroom. César leans against his desk as students 
recount recent instances of mob violence, including lynching of criminals and arson of the local 
police station and police vehicles. There is a mix of shame and defensiveness in their comments, as 
students are well aware of the dangers of reacting too quickly. Victor says, “Sometimes the people 
just do it to do it… There is no dialogue.” Another says, “They don’t open the space to talk. They 
just come with gasoline and start pouring it in the road. They don’t listen to what people have to 
say.” As the conversation gets heated, César exits the room to meet with other teachers in the 
hallway. Students continue the discussion, educating me about the limits placed on justice in their 
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pueblo. Gregorio explains that it is impossible to stop the escalation, “If you say anything—if you say, 
for example, let’s call the police instead of all this—they will say you are working with him too.”  
 But considering the dangers of taking justice into one’s own hands leads the students back to 
their instinctive beliefs, that some justice is better than none. Rosa says, “On one hand, I’m in favor 
of taking justice in your own hands, because what does justice do here? Right now, here, justice 
doesn’t do anything.” David agrees, “It’s true. Even if you capture a criminal, they let them 
go…And when they are set free, they say, ‘Tomorrow we steal.’ This is how the cycle continues. 
This is why people have to take justice into their own hands.” 
 This conversation, notably taking place in the absence of their teacher, demonstrates how 
young people struggle to make meaning of justicia propia, and how the moral valence of these extreme 
acts shifts depending on how it is situated. When I ask students about the kinds of violence that 
affects their community, they list domestic abuse, gangs, and the range of street crime that the 
neighborhood watch groups and flash mobs respond to. Not one student includes justicia propia as a 
form of violence. The violent nature of people’s justice reveals itself only through careful 
examination, and even then it remains tied to exclusion, neglect, and victimization. Students fear it, 
but they understand it.  
 Not all acts outside the law are collective or public-spirited, as Oscar romanticizes them to 
be, but youth voices demonstrate that these transgressions are both acts of resistance and acts of 
order. Young people talk about justicia propia as both acts of despair, revealing deep frustrations with 
the state, and as acts of autonomous collaboration, a “making” of justice, even if what is generated is 
more damaging than constructive. These are simultaneously “stories of failure” (Santamaría, 2012: 
:45) and stories of people coming together. In the process, young people negotiate the lines they are 
willing to cross in a state too weak or corrupt to guarantee basic protections. At times proud of their 
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willingness to come together as a community, they are also ashamed and fearful that violence is the 
default. 
Strategic withdrawal 
 Given the landscape of violence, limited public spaces for civic expression and dissent, and 
the risks associated with civic participation, inaction has increasingly become the duty of the “good” 
citizen in a struggling, “postwar” democracy. Despite consistent, cross-cultural findings that positive 
youth development and civic participation mutually reinforce one another (Sherrod et al., 2010), 
under extreme conditions, young people in Guatemala articulate the ways that attitudes of civic 
distancing and disengagement serve to benefit both individuals and collectives. 
 Abstaining from civic participation stems from fear of physical harm, skepticism that 
systemic change can begin with popular movements, and the conviction that good citizens abide by 
the rule of law. Twelfth grader Yolanda explains that people had mixed feelings when the 
international mining company arrived in Río Verde. Like other indigenous communities, they 
initially organized a resistance movement, concerned about pollution, displacement, and land 
dispossession. Their concerns have not been alleviated, but the prospects of peaceful, democratic 
dialogue evaporated as resource extraction companies across the country grew increasingly 
associated with repressive acts. Meanwhile, the state has intervened in these conflicts by instituting 
martial law to “stabilize” subversive communities.  
It has been years since the mine arrived in our town. They promised to bring jobs, to 
employ the people of the village… They have hired no one. I know many qualified 
men who have dropped off their papers, and the mine has not hired any of them… 
We want to have a dialogue with them, but this is not possible. If we organize, or if 
we arrive at the mine, they might kill us. We have seen it happen in other towns.  
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Yolanda’s classmate, David, agrees that the student protest in a nearby town “was a good attempt at 
resistance, but the companies are powerful.” These statements speak to the challenge of youth civic 
development in contexts where holding state or non-state actors and institutions accountable is 
“beyond the reach of most young people” (Kassimir and Flanagan, 2010: :254). Over time, citizens 
of Río Verde have adjusted their expectations, from wanting to expel the mine to hoping that it 
becomes a “good neighbor.” Yet there appears to be no safe way to pressure the mine into dialogue 
without endangering individual organizers, jeopardizing village autonomy, and risking the prospect 
of the mine becoming a “bad” neighbor that intentionally diverts resources away from the 
community. Though anti-mining protests continue to mobilize popular support in other rural 
communities and even from afar in the capital, the civic space for engaging with the mine in Río 
Verde has never opened—in part, due to fear. Most young people in the village agree that the future 
of this relationship is not in the hands of citizens, but at the whim of the companies and their 
entanglement with state power. 
In many cases, young people deny feeling afraid, instead describing sentiments of intense 
anger and impotence. Distancing themselves from perpetual injustice is not grounded in apathy and 
desensitization, but an impression of fundamental powerlessness—what Kaiser (2005: :21) 
designates as a “culture of impunity,” where citizens habitually experience “impotence and anger at 
the absence of justice.” Romeo (16, Guatemala City) describes how he felt the second time he was 
robbed at gunpoint for his cell phone.  
  I wasn’t scared. I remember feeling powerless … I had to let it happen and wait  
  for it to end, and I knew that whatever he did, it wouldn’t matter, because no one  
  would do anything about it. Not the police, not anyone. 
After this incident, Romeo avoided public buses and stopped going out beyond his gated 
community, reconstituting his social network to the physical space of his neighborhood. Most days, 
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he stays within a two-block radius of his family home. Luisa (17, Guatemala City) describes being 
assaulted several times in her home neighborhood, so that she rarely goes outside for anything other 
than school. “I can’t even walk to the store down the street. I can’t go anywhere.” When I ask about 
the role of police, she explains that, “If they come, they plant drugs on you and then arrest you. 
Because they just want money, they want you to pay them to not arrest you… There is no one you 
can call, nothing you can do...” Urban youth in particular have adjusted their “socio-spatial 
freedom” (Winton, 2005: :173) in efforts to remain safe and interact in the most trusted, “atomized” 
social networks (Winton, 2005: :180). As Luisa makes clear, walking down the street is a liability in a 
society where “the state does not protect its citizens.” Urban working class students, habitually 
exposed to street violence and often mistaken for criminals themselves, repeatedly allude to what 
Luisa says very plainly: collective, civic, and public-spirited action is impractical under extreme 
conditions where, “All you can do is take care of yourself.”  
Yet cynicism toward civil society’s transformative potential is not synonymous with civic 
apathy. Indifference to rights violations has been argued to be a natural human condition, an 
emotionally protective response to trauma, and a psychosocial consequence of political violence 
(Jelin, 2003). But it is also related to discursive practices that legitimize indifference as a valid 
response to widespread injustice, so that “doing nothing” becomes an active choice (Seu, 2003; 
Tester, 2002). In Guatemala, distancing and inaction are validated and perpetuated through 
discourses that criminalize social movements and link collective organizing to social agitation and 
unrest.  
 Being “involved” was a strong discourse during the war, denoting sympathy with the guerrilla 
movement (Sanford, 2008). It became a way for the state to justify political violence, and for people 
to distance themselves from the conflict by blaming the victim, a strategy that continues to serve 
these psychosocial purposes today. For example, David’s mother (Río Verde) explains that today’s 
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violence “does not apply to everyone… It is the ones who are involved in something.” This rhetoric 
of blame serves as a distancing mechanism, so that David can assure himself that he will be safe as 
long as he does not become “involved.” Simultaneously this act redraws the lines of normalcy, so 
that violence inflicted becomes a rational, predictable consequence for high-risk actions, such as 
participation in social movements. The resilience of this discourse is an indicator of undisturbed 
authoritarian legacies, wherein citizens are expected to acquiesce, rather than resist, when the system 
they are embedded in is fundamentally unjust. 
 It becomes the domain of the good citizen to abstain from acting for the sake of individual 
security, national harmony, and state stability. Young people point to flawed and untrustworthy 
institutions, as well as flawed and untrustworthy fellow citizens, as their reasons for not taking 
action. It is both the state police who “sell justice” and local citizens who terrorize public spaces that 
contribute to conceptions of good citizens as compliant and apolitical. Their concerns reflect the 
complexity of nonparticipation, revealing that inaction and professed disengagement do not 
necessarily imply a lack of knowledge or civic attachment. Nor do citizens withdraw from public 
spaces without care, concern, and contemplation. Decisions about how and when to act, and how 
and when to remove oneself, are often fraught with anxieties about efficacy, physical risk, and 
power. 
Implications for civic education in extremis  
 As the field of youth civic engagement has “come of age” (Sherrod et al., 2010), research has 
shifted from an emphasis on political socialization to recognition that young people develop as civic 
actors in constant dialogue with cultural resources, actors, and contexts (Torney-Purta and Barber, 
2011). Authoritarian legacies persist in “cultural repertoires” (Rogoff et al., 2007: :490), “the formats 
of (inter)action with which individuals have experience and may take up, resist, and transform.” Civil 
society’s engagement with the state through resistance movements has become a powerful cultural 
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repertoire across Latin America (Cesarini and Hite, 2004), both a remnant and a response to decades 
of state terror and authoritarian rule. In turn, these repertoires frame and constrain conceptions of 
good citizenship today.  
 At its extremes, good citizenship in “postwar” Guatemala either requires distancing, 
disengagement, and self-reliance, or breaking the law in order to access a civic voice. Eerily 
reminiscent of wartime repression, civic “involvement” remains a dangerous forum for exercising 
one’s voice. Consequently, collective action is construed as dangerous for individuals, as well as 
damaging to state cohesion. Meanwhile, “filling the gap” veers into vigilantism and extrajudicial 
violence. These are not merely unconscious reproductions of cultural repertoires, but also new sites 
of contestation, representing profound neglect and exclusion from the civic space. In the process, 
breaking the law to fill gaps creates new voids. The persistence of blame placed on social movements 
and youth criminals reinforces the cultural repertoire that good citizenship resides in 
nonparticipation. 
 Educational actors and institutions have an important role to play in dismantling these 
authoritarian legacies and facilitating young people’s understanding of the civil contracts that 
underlie democratic arrangements. Yet schools are embedded institutions and are not always in a 
position to lead change, especially when challenging the status quo carries threats to personal 
security. How can educators promote messages of youth civic empowerment when there is strong 
evidence that civic action is dangerous—when young people fear rather than trust state actors, when 
young people are vigilant rather than reliant on their neighbors? Teachers visibly struggle to 
reconcile democratic civic ideals with the everyday realities they share with their students, and at 
times they become complicit in promoting conceptions of good citizens who acquiesce in the face 
of unjust systems. César leaves the room as his students delve into an honest reflection of 
community violence, admitting that he is not sure “what to tell them.” Additionally, most students 
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regard this conversation as atypical and not indicative of school learning, because they “already 
know” their reality. Young people, too, have come to believe that civic dialogue has little value when 
authentic openings for civic participation are absent.  
 Young people’s interpretations of civic opportunities and obligations in “postwar” 
Guatemala force us to reconcile with several fundamental questions. Notably, does civic action have 
to fall within the realm of the legal in order to be civic? At the other extreme, can strategic withdrawal 
from public spaces be construed as acts with lasting civic value, in that they avoid public conflict? 
To what extent do extreme times call for extreme measures and new ethical criteria for what 
constitutes civic action? For too many Guatemalan youth, the only world they know is one of 
extreme conditions. On the other hand, civic discourse alone is an insufficient criterion for breaking 
the law, when mass violence is frequently carried out in the name of security and the common good. 
This study demonstrates the need for further research on the qualities of civic engagement, as well as 
the underlying logic governing young people’s decisions about participation in states that are no 
longer authoritarian, but not yet democracies.  
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